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SALT TWO
SESSION I
A-118

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 19, 1972

TIME: 2000 - 2015

PLACE: Swiss Reception
Eaux Vives Restaurant

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

H. Brown

A. N. Shchukin

I asked Shchukin whether he had given further thought to the various weapons systems we had discussed following the previous plenary, and whether he thought it possible for sides to exercise "restraint" by not developing or deploying selected items from that group. He replied that he would continue to think about it during the recess.

He said that it was important to decide first which items the sides desired to have limited, and after that to proceed to the question of verification.

I said that though it was possible to go at the question that way, in deciding which systems should be considered for limitation I had already considered how control would be effected. In particular, in some cases I thought it would have to be through prohibition of testing or limitation of how rapidly testing would proceed. He repeated that a decision should first be made what should be limited and to what numbers and then the control question should be faced; he did not show interest in my approach.

I suggested that the sides were now in a position that they must consider militarily acceptable, and wondered whether there was not some way to stop or at least greatly slow down further

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actions of all sorts. I asked whether he thought there were people on both sides willing to accept the present situation only because they thought incorrectly that their present respective ongoing or planned programs would mean their relative positions would improve in the future. He replied that he thought it would be easy to settle these matters if it were left to him and to me but that there are many people of influence (presumably he was referring to individuals in his own government) who do not recognize that the developments of each side produce a counter-reaction by the other that leaves the first side no better off. He thinks it will take some time to educate decision makers to this and in the meantime we should look for small steps that can be taken to improve matters.

During the course of the discussion, he mentioned that he thought Garwin's paper on ASW, though offering something in its suggestion that ASW developments might be limited, was naïve in assuming that free passage of ballistic missile submarines during a non-nuclear war between the two sides could be allowed. He had also read a recent paper of Rathjens on the SALT I agreements. He noted that Rathjens had questioned the value of the offensive interim measures, but concluded that those who have even as much responsibility for the decisions as he and I have would reach different conclusions than had Rathjens.

He asked about my future participation in the talks and said this would be an important factor in his decision about his own participation. He said that at his age one has to think carefully about how one uses the rest of his time. I replied I could not be sure of what would happen, since there would undoubtedly be changes in our delegation. However, I thought it likely that I would continue. I said that I thought it extremely important that he continue on their delegation because it would, in my opinion, improve the chances of

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better communication and of a good agreement; he seemed to me to have real influence and understanding of matters. It was the hope that the same was true of myself that made me willing to continue.

HB
SALDEL:HBrown:mb
December 20, 1972

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